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Professor Frase, thank you for providing such a rich structure for our 
discussion today.1  My own remarks will be brief, underscoring several of the 
issues you raised and adding a few more.  First, the core concepts you came 
back to time and again were these: simplicity, flexibility, balance, and multiple 
alternatives.  Certainly, these are the lessons we have learned from the federal 
experience; unfortunately, we learned the hard way, by trying to implement 
and make sense of a guideline system that is deficient in each of these respects. 
Another lesson I think we have learned from the federal experience is that 
it is a major mistake to construct a system of guidelines whose primary 
structural objective is to minimize inter-judge sentencing disparity.  That was 
the central goal of both Congress and the Sentencing Commission, and a recent 
empirical study (of which I was a co-author) suggests that the guidelines have 
reduced this form of disparity significantly.2 
But at what price?  There are many sources of unwarranted sentencing 
disparity besides that deriving from the identity of the judge.  The annual 
reports issued by the Sentencing Commission reveal significant inter-district 
and inter-circuit disparity.  There is also significant disparity in charging, plea 
and downward departure policies among U.S. Attorneys offices, and there is 
great variation in law enforcement policies and approaches, and among 
probation offices in conducting pre-sentence investigations.  Moreover, 
minimizing unwarranted disparity (from whatever source) should not be the 
only value pursued in constructing a system of sentencing guidelines.  We 
want sentences that are, in the end, reasonable.  And we want them to be 
arrived at through a reasoned process. 
There is one area in which both the federal system and most state systems 
may be inadequate.  Nearly all proponents of guidelines have tended to see 
 
 1. Editor’s note: See Professor Frase’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425-46 (2000), in 
this issue. 
 2. See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 
(1999).  In this study, we assumed that judges in the same district have the same types of cases, 
over the course of several years, because of random case assignment.  The study compared the 
average sentences of judges within a district both before and after the implementation of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  We found that between 1986 and 1993 average sentences 
increased from approximately 26 months to approximately 38 months, and that the expected 
difference in sentence between any two judges in the same district (that is, inter-judge disparity) 
fell from approximately five months to approximately four months. 
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reduction-of-disparity as the antithesis of individualized sentencing.  The idea 
is: If we are to achieve less disparity, we must also have less individualization 
of sentences.  But I wonder if there is not a role for Guidelines that are helpful 
in true individualization of sentences.  Could we have Guidelines that really 
help the judge structure his or her discretion?  Could we have Guidelines that 
help the judge have a better sense of which defendants will be most amenable 
to rehabilitation, for instance, or which at least let the judge know how cases 
like the one at bar have been sentenced by other judges in the state? 
On the federal level, judges were actually provided some of this 
information in pre-sentence reports in the pre-Guidelines era.  Now, judges are 
not told how similar cases are generally sentenced; the only guidance given to 
the judge is in the form of the rules of the Guidelines themselves.  And these 
rules, contrary to popular belief, are for the most part not based on pre-
Guidelines sentencing practices in the federal courts. 
Moreover, even this “guidance,” though that is not really the right word, is 
not provided in a significant number of cases.  On average, twenty percent of 
all federal sentences are left to the sole discretion of the federal judge, and her 
decision is essentially unreviewable.  These are the cases in which the 
government has made a motion for a downward departure due to the 
defendant’s cooperation in the prosecution of others.  I have never understood 
why there is not at least some advisory guidance for the judge in these 
situations.  Basically, either the sentence is inflexibly rule-bound, or bound by 
no rules at all.  Surely there is a better way. 
How do these various lessons apply to the State of Missouri?  First, it 
seems to me that before any presumptive Guidelines are constructed, you also 
must ask: What are the problems that we want Guidelines to address?  Is the 
big problem disparity?  What are the sources of this disparity?  Are there other 
problems that could be either reduced or exacerbated through a guidelines 
system? 
You also would want to consider the role of all of the institutions in the 
criminal justice system, not just sentencing judges.  What, if anything, should 
be the role of parole?  Might appeal on an abuse-of-discretion basis be 
sufficient to avoid the occasional bizarre sentence and excessively harsh or 
lenient sentences?  Can the Missouri appellate courts play a role in 
constructing a common-law of sentencing, as Maine is doing?  What about 
prosecutorial authority in Missouri?  How are prosecutors appointed?  At what 
level is prosecutorial policy made?  Let me stress that there is no single “right” 
system of sentencing guidelines.  Every state has a different legal culture and 
different needs. 
I also venture to say that there is no single “right” sentence in any case.  It 
may be important in a pluralistic society to recognize that nobody has the only 
good answer; this would imply a sentencing system that requires reason and 
reasonableness but allows some variation.  “Disparity” may be a pejorative 
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way of describing an inevitable characteristic of a pluralistic democracy that 
has a variety of power points and checks and balances in its criminal justice 
system. 
Finally, I come back to my first piece of advice: simplicity.  In the criminal 
law more than any other area of the law, I would argue, it is important that the 
meaning and working of the law be understandable to all citizens.  If you look 
at our substantive criminal law in this country, you will see that much of it is 
pretty simple.  It is almost “Thou shall not do this.”  Likewise, if there are to be 
presumptive sentencing Guidelines, then they also should be comprehensible 
to the victim of crime and his family, to the defendant and his family and to the 
individuals in the community who seek justice.  “Simplicity” is important not 
simply to make guideline-sentencing easier for judges and defense attorneys 
and prosecutors.  Comprehensibility is an essential component of the rule of 
law itself. 
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